Switzerland

Switzerland is one of the most closed markets in Europe, and the closure is the first and most important fact for an operator. Under the Money Gaming Act in force since 2019, online casino licences are available only to holders of a Swiss land-based casino concession. There is no standalone online licence, so a foreign operator cannot simply apply. The federal ESBK supervises casinos and Gespa oversees lotteries and sports betting, and offshore sites are DNS-blocked via an ESBK blacklist that internet providers must enforce. The strategic point is that entering Switzerland is a partnership problem, not a licensing application, and an operator who does not solve the partnership does not enter at all.

Online rights are tied to land-based concessions. The Federal Council granted 22 land-based concessions for 2025 to 2044, of which around 10 currently operate online casinos. Because online rights attach to those concessions, the number of online brands is capped at the concession-holders who choose to apply, and a new entrant has no route to a licence of its own. The only way in is behind an existing concession-holder's brand, through a B2B, platform or revenue-share arrangement, which makes the commercial terms of that relationship the whole game.

The blocking regime protects the licensed market. Switzerland actively DNS-blocks offshore operators, and the ESBK maintains and updates the blacklist that providers must enforce. That keeps channelization high and protects the concession-holders inside the market, which is good for the licensed brands and bad for anyone hoping to build an offshore-fed business. The enforcement is a feature of the protectionist design, not an afterthought, and it means the regulated market is genuinely the market.

The tax rewards efficiency inside a closed system. Online gross gaming revenue is taxed progressively, starting at roughly 20% and rising with revenue, while the land-based base rate begins at 40% on the first tranche of GGR. The economics therefore favour efficient operation within the concession model rather than aggressive growth, because the structure is closed and the tax climbs with scale. For a partner operating behind a concession-holder, the margin is shaped as much by the partnership terms as by the tax.

What winning looks like. Winning in Switzerland looks like a well-structured partnership with a land-based concession-holder, a product and platform that strengthen that brand's online offering, and an operation efficient enough to work within a progressive tax and a closed market. The operators who succeed treat the concession relationship as the core strategic asset and build the rest of the proposition around it, much as the better entrants do in other partnership-gated markets like Belgium.

The regional play. Switzerland is a small, high-income, closed market that suits operators able to add B2B or platform value to a domestic concession-holder rather than those seeking a standalone licence. It rarely belongs early in a sequence given the partnership requirement, and where a closed market like this fits an entry plan is part of the multi-market sequencing piece.

The biggest mistake. The biggest mistake is treating Switzerland as an open-licensing market you can apply into, when online rights are reserved for land-based concession-holders. The related mistake is hoping to serve Swiss players from offshore in a market that actively blocks it. Solve the concession partnership first, build to strengthen a licensed brand, and only commit once the terms make the economics work.